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Book
Review
Belief
and Imagination:
Explorations
in Psychoanalysis
By
Ron Britton
The following is from an address Mrs Bion
gave in April 1994 in Toronto and Montreal, Canada. It was first published
in The Journal of the Melanie Klein & Object Relations Journal, Vol 13,
No.1, 1995.
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Published by Routledge Pb © 1999, ISBN/ISSN:
0-415-19438-5, Price: US $29.99, UK £17.99 |
Belief and Imagination brings
together Ronald Britton's writing on these subjects over the last
15 years, exploring the concepts from a Kleinian perspective. The
book covers ' the status of phantasies in an individuals mind -
are they facts or possibilities?'
'how the notions of objectivity and subjectivity are
interrelated and have their origins in the Oedipal triangle'; ' how
phantasies which are held to be products of the imagination, can be
accounted for in psychoanalytic terms'. Britton also examines the
relationship between psychic reality and fictional writing, and the ways
in which belief, imagination and reality are explored in the works of
Wordsworth, Rilke, Milton and Blake.
BELIEF AND IMAGINATION – EXPLORATIONS IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS
Review by
Robert Oelsner (2001)
“Know then
thyself, presume not God to scan,
The proper study of mankind is man.”
(Alexander Pope – from Selections from an “Essay on Man”)
The book starts with an introduction that tells us about the main
issues that will be dealt with and the psychoanalysts the author
acknowledges as his source of inspiration. Freud, Klein, Bion,
Winnicott (unusual for a Kleinian, Winnicott’s presence floats in the
atmosphere where not explicitly mentioned), Betty Joseph, Herbert
Rosenfeld, O’Shaugnessy, Steiner, are the most frequently quoted.
Then there is Thomas Kuhn (author of ‘The
structure of scientific revolutions’), who is the source of the
mathematical formula that comes up in chapter 6, ‘Before and after the
depressive position,’ where Britton introduces some new ideas
regarding Klein’s established theory of psychotic positions. Kuhn is
also the theoretical frame of reference for ‘Publication Anxiety,’
which is the theme of the last chapter. Last but not least there is a
list of poets. Mainly Wordsworth, Milton, Coleridge, Rilke and Blake.
Why do they appear in this book?
The author lets us know that poetry has
been a passion of his (needless to say when you have read the book)
and that he also believes that poets, together with philosophers and
theologians, have explored the same areas psychoanalysts have. What
anyone can draw from this is that Britton is a widely open-minded
author and analyst who is concerned with the study of man.
Though the book is based on papers that have been written over a
period of some fifteen years, its structure is one of a
well-integrated unit. The issues that Britton presents are related to
one another like pearls on a thread along the different chapters.
Thus belief, counter-belief, imagination,
phantasy, as-if syndrome, borderline syndrome, fear of chaos,
complacency, containment, countertransference, daydreams, fictions,
epistemic narcissism, illusions, malignant misunderstanding,
thin-skinned and thick-skinned narcissism, the ‘other room’,
objectivity and subjectivity, pathological organisations, defensive
organisations, third position and triangular psychic space, and
visions, are developed continuously as you go on reading. In order to
gain clarity, Britton takes you through a winding way that goes from
concepts to theory, from theory to case material and from there to
poetry, in cycles that resemble the growth of a helicoid. You are
never brought back to the same place, even if you have the false
impression that you are. This is the feeling the reader gets when
travelling with the author through the following chapters.
‘Belief and psychic reality’ is an overture to this work with
definitely new melodies. What long has been established as psychic
reality is minutely examined and deconstructed into phantasy, belief,
counter-belief, disbelief, knowledge and disorders of the function of
belief. Belief seems to be in the realm of psychic reality, the
counterpart of religious beliefs in the external world. Without
beliefs in what is going on in your internal theatre and in what your
perceptions tell you about the external world, you are in a psychic
and social unreality. But if you cannot relinquish (another term that
comes up many times here) your primitive beliefs for new ones as you
go on living and gain in experience, you remain what the author later
on explains further, an ‘epistemic narcissist,’ like Blake. In order
to attune your thinking apparatus, it is necessary to go from the
paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive position and to
relinquish and mourn for your previously established beliefs. Only
then will one be fit for living in the world and finding one’s way
through thinking. Belief, says Britton, is in the realm of knowledge
(K in Bion’s term) - what attachment is in the realm of love (L link
for Bion).
‘Naming and containing’ departs from Bion’s container and contained
concepts and the function of mother's reverie, in order to achieve the
internalisation of an object that, through containing notions and
emotions internally, helps recognize them, symbolise their meaning,
and finally operate with thoughts. If one lacks such an object (as
borderline and psychotics certainly do), one cannot keep precursors of
thought in mind. There are three routes through which these primitive
and non-symbolised elements can exit: through the body causing
psychosomatic disorders, through the sense organs causing
hallucinations, or through the muscular system by means of symptomatic
action. Miss A is the patient through whom Britton illustrates his
points with interesting clarity.
‘Oedipus in the depressive position’, ‘Subjectivity, objectivity and
triangular space’ and ‘Before and after the depressive position’ are
linked together. The main issue here is that the Oedipus situation is
connected with the realisation that one is not the only possessor of
each one of the parent’s love separately, and that the Oedipus complex
is an illusion, a counter-belief in Britton’s language, utilised as a
defense against the former realisation. To come to terms with the
Oedipus situation requires the working through of the depressive
position, and in order to achieve this, the Oedipus complex has to be
worked through. One seems to depend on the other. This gives us a new
perspective to differentiate what we usually see as one single issue:
Oedipus situation and Oedipus complex. Certainly if this realisation
is not tolerated - for it implies the negative realisation about
mother’s and father’s separate single love for only the child - the
whole thought can be attacked from inside and evacuated, as Bion
taught us, into a degraded product. This may happen through any of the
three exits mentioned above; a thought or even a precursor of a
thought can be evacuated from the mind. This is close to what Freud
has called Verwerfung.
Triangular space is also related to the achievement of the depressive
position and its working through. Triangular space seems to be an
imaginary conceived space that allows one to be observer of him or
herself while being oneself. The integration of subjective and
objective experience is also an aim of the depressive working through,
relinquishing all previous monocular vision and knowledge. Blake, as
Britton shows us in the last chapters of the book, was far from
achieving or willing to achieve this aim. Schizoid and borderline
patients seem to have developed different means of keeping the
integration of subjectivity and objectivity at bay. Schizoid, called
thick-skinned patients by Britton, remain hyper-objective and look at
themselves as if they were a third party (the analyst, for instance),
while borderline thin-skinned patients remain hyper-subjective and
reject the third position view of themselves. This picture reminds us
of Bion’s reversal of perspective as a defense against depressive
pain. It is either/or instead of either/and. Integration is what has
to be avoided for fear of chaos.
The suspension of belief and the ‘as-if syndrome’ deals with defensive
manoeuvres, in order to achieve a rigid balance instead of integration
and psychic (catastrophic) change. In Before and after the depressive
position, Kuhn’s concepts of scientific new paradigm and post-paradigm
states are in the background. It presents a more general theory about
the belief system as a counterpart of scientific knowledge applied to
the working through of the Oedipus complex into the Oedipus situation.
This requires mourning and depressive relinquishment of previously
established beliefs (like the early Oedipus complex itself) and later
on all other beliefs that have to be tested in the inner as well as
the external world. Thus, this chapter is an extension from sexuality
to epistemology. Bion’s epistemic Oedipus vertex is at hand here.
Complacency in analysis and everyday life is about another variety of
patients that seem to utilise their intelligence in order to hinder
the analyst and the analysis from reaching them. Here, too,
catastrophic anxiety is menacing the self of these people who know
well (unconsciously) why they have become experts in allowing their
analysts to develop their analyses, making them believe that
everything progresses while nothing happens (impasse). Complacency is
a kind of passivity used defensively in order to convince the analyst
that there is no resistance, and possibly, I believe, that both could
analyze some nonessential issue and abandon what is being really
dreaded for fear of chaos; that is, psychic change. This picture is a
variation of the as-if syndrome.
The analyst’s intuition: selected fact or overvalued idea is an
application to the analyst’s mind, while at work with his or her
patient, of what has been said about beliefs in the first chapter.
Britton quotes Balint’s (almost mean) assertion that Kleinian analysts
act omniscient, causing their patients to passively submit to them. He
reminds us that this is not what one would think of a true Kleinian.
Perhaps there is something in Kleinianism or in Kleinian technique,
however, that can either cause this impression, or actually develop
into a misuse in the realm of omniscience. It is sad to say, but this
criticism is familiar to us in different latitudes. Bion’s suggestion
to suspend memory and desire in favour of intuition, (Klein herself
was undoubtedly a great “intuitionist”) made the employment of
intuition valuable but risky. The risks we run under this technique
are addressed here. One would only wonder why Meltzer’s Routine and
inspired interpretation (1973) and Delusion of clarity of insight
(1976) have not been quoted as they are important contributions to the
theme.
In Daydream, phantasy and fiction, a further development of belief,
imagination and phantasy is presented. There are phantasies that
express psychic reality and others that, in a defensive mood, express
psychic unreality. Super-realism can also be employed to avoid psychic
reality. Thus the aim here is avoiding or denying psychic reality.
This theme returns in one of the chapters on William Blake, when
Britton tries to solve an apparent paradox: why is it that a misguided
belief can be the basis of a great poet or poetic creation? He answers
that Blake (like other artists – Dali?) is truthful when he describes
his follies poetically, and that it is this sad truth that we
aesthetically appreciate as art.
The other room and poetic space reminds me of André Green’s (1974)
discrepancy with Freud’s position, who thought that the Wolf Man had
actually witnessed his parents’ intercourse. Britton, like Green,
takes as a starting point in this chapter that the development of
phantasy takes place only when the parents’ room is closed to the
child’s eye. Hence ‘the other room.’ The primal scene is a
construction of the mind and belongs to a phantasy, according to
Freud, rooted in Urphantasien that are inborn to the human species.
The ‘other room,’ the space of imagination where phantasies can grow,
has to be necessarily a blank space, like Bertrand Lewin’s white
screen onto which dreams can be projected.
Four further chapters are Britton’s divertimento before this beautiful
book comes to an end. He has already confessed that he is an amateur
of poetry. And here we meet Wordsworth, Coleridge (briefly), Rilke and
Blake. Analysing the infant babe lines of Wordsworth’s The Prelude, he
offers that Klein’s findings on early infantile development were
already present in the poet’s mind. And why not? True poets are in
touch with human nature (even with psychosis as Blake proves), and
Britton seemingly loves poets and poetry as much as he loves Melanie
Klein. He utilises here, again, his formula borrowed from Kuhn, to
reach the conclusion mathematically that Coleridge and Wordsworth had
collapses in their creative lives at different points of the
depressive position (and formula): one before and the other after the
depressive outcome. Rilke, the German poet, poses a psychoanalytic
riddle: how is it possible that someone with such an unfortunate
infantile background becomes such a wonderful creator? We are familiar
with people who, having had dreadful infantile experiences, become
outstanding personalities, while others with a seemingly favourable
background, collapse. I said Britton wrote these chapters as his
personal divertimento, and the reader will enjoy following the author
in search of a scientific solution.
When reaching Milton’s Paradise Lost and comparing it to Blake’s
Marriage of heaven and hell, Britton plays his best game. He thinks in
the way of a double perspective (the inverse of reversal of
perspective) and so makes us look at Milton on a tandem with Herbert
Rosenfeld, competing against Blake with Winnicott. What seems a
well-achieved object related self for Rosenfeld-Milton (and probably
Wordsworth and Rilke too), is an adaptive false self with a split off
true self for Winnicott-Blake. The former team considers destructive
narcissism to be what the latter consider the true self. What is the
expression of a true self for one team is taken as a psychotic
breakdown for the other. Extrapolating these ideas one could reach a
stunning conclusion (and why not?): psychosis is more real (true) than
neurosis and there is no way of remaining one’s own true self outside
primary or psychotic narcissism. So what the majority call sanity is
nothing but alienation. The reader can make his own choice in the
game.
Britton closes his creative opera with a chapter on Publication
Anxiety, probably rooted in his own experience as the writer of this
book. Repeating a melodic theme he has developed earlier, but this
time in a different tempo and orchestration, he tells us what human
anxieties are to be faced when making private knowledge public. He
takes us from personal experiences to literary authors and to
theoretical conceptualisation. For instance, utilizing Kuhn’s ideas on
the life cycle of a paradigm from rise to fall, he comes to the
conclusion that the nature of publication anxieties will depend on the
phase the paradigm that is in the background of the ideas made public,
is going through. Two growing fears are put forward here taking
Charles Darwin for illustration: (1) The paranoid fear of being
destroyed by the audience (the Establishment in Bion’s terms); and (2)
The depressive fear of being held responsible for the destruction of
the Establishment the new ideas may cause. ‘Distortions’ of one’s own
ideas in one’s publications may appear as a neurotic symptom.
They are intended to satisfy both the
desire to communicate one’s own thoughts (perhaps an innate drive
rooted in the Id?) and the desire to be complacent with one’s own
persecutory or depressing Superego.
The result of Britton’s attempt to publish his thoughts has been
successful, and the reader will enrich him or herself both with a good
piece of true psychoanalytic creative ideas, as well as literary and
poetical culture. The profoundness of the developments in the book
requires a thoughtful reader who can take his time to mentally digest
what the author is offering.
REFERENCES
Green, André (1974): lectures in the Argentine Association of
Psychoanalysis.
Meltzer, D. (1973): in Scientific Bulletin of the British
Psychoanalytical Society, 64.
Meltzer, D. (1975): paper given at the IPA Congress in London.
Published in the IJPA, 1976, LVII, 1.
Dr Robert Oelsner
2801 Western Ave. #435
Seattle WA 98121
Ph.: (206) 441 3667
E-mail:
robertoelsner@aol.com
Click
Here for a sample chapter from Belief and Imagination,
reproduced with the kind permission of the Editor of the New Library
of Psychoanalysis series (see NLP pages of the BPAS Online website at
www.psychoanalysis.org.uk/newlibr2.htm ).
Review by Marilyn Lawrence. (2000)
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy vol 14, no 1, pp93-95.
This is one of the latest in the New
Library of Psychoanalysis, edited
by Elizabeth Spillius. It is a deep and complex
book, many-layered
and difficult to summarise.
Entitled Belief and Imagination, I
think the sub-title more aptly encompasses the range of the work.
It is at once hugely broad;
a treatise on human nature.
At the same time it is a carefully focused book about the
Oedipus complex. Ronald Britton locates himself as a British post
Kleinian. It is
perhaps this re-emphasis on the centrality of the Oedipus
situation in all fields of human endeavour,
founded on a more of less securely established loving
relationship with a primary maternal object, signified by Bion's
notion of containment, which marks out this increasingly distinctive school of
thought.
Although
the product of fifteen years of work and bringing together a number
of previously published papers,
the book is a pleasingly integrated
work.
For
Britton, the 'epistemophilic impulse',
the wish to know and be known,
is not a
component of love and hate, but
rather a drive in itself, but
mingled with and complicated by the other two.
The depressive position,
as outlined by Klein and the Oedipus situation are,
for Britton ..'inextricably intertwined in such a way that
one cannot be resolved without the other; we resolve the Oedipus
complex by working through the depressive position
and the depressive position by working through the Oedipus
complex.' Throughout
the book, Britton examines the different ways in which belief
masquerades as knowledge always acknowledging the difficulty
of giving up our beliefs and the work of mourning which is required
to do so. But what is
imagination? Where,
psychically is it located?
This question resonates throughout the chapters. He presents
his ideas on the fundamental
importance of finding triangular space,
the space which is encompassed by the parents relationship to
each other and to their children…. here we
are on the trail of the imagination.
Chapters
1 - 8 are
essentially clinical accounts of our attempts to evade the oedipus
situation and the depressive position.
These chapters are a clinical tour de force and touch and
often build upon ideas which we have encountered through the works
of Segal, Joseph, Malcolm and Steiner.
Chapters
10 - 14 comprise an extraordinary application of these ideas to the
field of literature, in
particular the works of Wordsworth, Rilke, Milton and Blake.
At
various points in the book, Britton
refers to Donald Winnicott's ideas,
which as he says, have
had an influence parallel with that of the post Kleinians.
In this series of papers,
Winnicott can be
taken as Britton's interlocutor.
He examines Winnicott's view of transitional space and finds
it to be closer to anxiety free mother-infant space as distinct from
the less comfortable but ultimately safer position in the space
which the parents create together in their minds for their child. In
this sense, Winnicott's
transitional space, if
used excessively would be in danger of becoming a psychic retreat.
Again and again, Britton
stresses his own contention, that
it is adequate maternal containment
which makes the triangular space safe and creative rather than
malignant and empty. In this way, he seems to link with and diverge from Winnicott
time and again. One
senses that he is trying to locate Winnicott in relation to his own
school of thought and in the final chapter on Publication Anxiety,
he indeed looks in detail at the complex series of
affiliations and counter-affiliations which marked Winnicott's
relations to the Klein group in the 1950's. However,
this is merely history.
It is in Chapter 13, Milton's
destructive narcissist or Blake's true self?
in which I felt some real progress had been made on the
matter. In this intriguing essay,
he juxtaposes Milton's concept of evil with that of Blake.
For Milton, it
is Satan, the proud, self-worshipping narcissist who lures humankind
away from it's knowledge of its dependence on the Father. For Blake, in contrast,
the ills of mankind lay in the abandonment of the true
authentic self, in
favour of a compliant and dependent relationship with an idealised
object. Britton sees these as analogous to Rosenfeld's destructive
narcissism and Winnicott's false self, respectively.
For
Britton, both are valid
descriptions of linked
though distinct types of psychopathology encountered in the
consulting room. No problem thus far. But
says Britton, when
these pathological situations are felt to be generalised,
when perhaps we begin even to reinterpret theory in the light
of them, then we might as psychoanalysts stop observing our patients
and instead get into disputes which resemble the theological
wrangles of the past. Britton
observes that our own
beliefs about the past are bound to influence the way we see things.
If we believe in a period of primary narcissism,
we are more likely to see pathology as linked to a false self
development in the face of the
overwhelming impingement of external reality. If on the other hand,
we believe in the primacy of the object relationship,
we are more likely to perceive narcissism as a problem.
Britton stresses the difficulty which the false self patients
present in treatment. They
are different and more difficult he thinks than the 'as if'
patients, for they
comprehend every attempt at objectivity on the part of the analyst
as an attack on their subjective selves. They seek to convert the
analyst to their way of thinking.
The alternative for them,
is to be taken over and made subject to the world view of
another. In the countertransference,
it is common to
feel 'changed' by such patients,
a phenomenon which Winnicott himself reports.
The pressure from the patient is always to change,
to abandon the
third position and give up the true transitional or triangular
space.
I find
this a helpful and illuminating commentary on two expositions of
psychopathology which are often represented quite independently of
each other as though
each leaves no space for the other. While other writers may want to
disagree with some details, a
bridge, a link, now exists.
The
chapter I feel least at ease with is chapter 9,
in which Britton attempts to differentiate between those
works of fiction which are truth-seeking and those which seek to
evade truth. Truth seeking works, he
argues are those which emanate directly or indirectly from the
infantile phantasy or dream of the writer,
while the truth-evading works of fiction are based upon
pleasure -seeking day dreams. While
I find his analysis of the creative process in Mary Shelley's
Frankenstein compelling, the whole project of dividing up the sheep
from the goats puts me in mind of the endless squabbling
within the Universities,
about which are the truly great works of literature and how
one knows it, which bedevilled English literature during my own
undergraduate days. I
am uneasy at the dismissal of popular culture as truth evading.
Why is it that we can find aspects of popular culture from
the past, both
religious and secular, to be worthwhile,
while we can find little or nothing of value in our own?
But this is the great joy of this book;
it makes one want to debate with Dr Britton,
to put another view. One
wants to ask him what he thinks about this or that.
It is not a book which demands a slavish or unquestioning
admiration.
Admiration
however, the book does
call forth. It is in my view both traditional and revolutionary. I will not discuss the final chapter on publication anxiety,
as for colleagues
who have not yet read
the book, it would be
to throw light prematurely on a very lovely twilight corner.
In the tradition of the post Kleinians,
Ronald Britton in Belief and Imagination
breaks new ground.
Marilyn
Lawrence
Review
by Dr Anton Obholzer, Psychoanalyst/Psychiatrist, Chief
Executive Tavistock and Portman NHS Trust.
If you're inclined to
coast along with your well-worn comfortable ideas and techniques, be
warned: do not read this book - it could seriously damage your
complacency and alter professional self-perception to a
discomforting degree!
While clearly in the
tradition of the work of the Klein group, Britton is also
discernibly himself, bringing to his writing not only an in-depth
knowledge of the leading psychoanalysts of this century but
combining it with the richness of both British and continental
literature and philosophy,- a mix that is heady, multi-layered and
uniquely Britton.
His style is clear,
easy to read and always illuminating, both in terms of the concept
and of the nuances of reflection that it evokes. In the
introduction, for example, he covers concepts such as projective
identification and anxiety in an orthodox yet arresting new way that
invites one to have fresh thoughts about them.
In other chapters he takes everyday working concepts such as Psychic
Reality; Containment; the Depressive Position, along with many ideas
and configurations of his own, and offers them up in a manner that
is very thought-provoking and stimulating.
Many book reviews end
with a recommendation to read or to buy the book. In this case a
recommendation is not enough. This book is essential reading for
anyone wanting to keep psychoanalytic thought alive and well.
Anton Obholzer
Copyright © 2006 The Melanie Klein Trust
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