Prejudice, Judgement, and the Narcissism Of Minor Differences:

notes stimulated by articles by Isaiah Berlin and Michael Ignatieff
 

Prejudice

In fact prejudice, although part of  the background to terrorism, does not adequately describe the state of mind of the terrorist.   It is certainly true that the terrorist feels himself to be in sole possession of the truth and that other versions of what is true have to be treated with hatred and contempt, but something more is needed to explain the idealisation of death and the belief of a  solution through violence and destructiveness. A psychoanalytic understanding of narcissism which takes account of the violent nature of primitive destructive forces seemed to me to be worth exploring and some of Freud’s ideas on the narcissism of minor differences are particularly apposite.  Perhaps this can lead us to understand how a narcissistic relationship becomes established between the fundamentalist and his objects which serves to establish an equilibrium to control and contain primitive impulses.  What leads to a breakdown of this kind of equilibrium and to a release of omnipotent destructiveness remains a central question.

 The narcissism of minor differences

In the course of a discussion about intermixing of hatred with love, Freud (1917) spoke about the narcissism of minor differences, and wrote as follows, “… it is precisely the minor differences in people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them.  It would be tempting to pursue this idea and to derive from this 'narcissism of minor differences' the hostility which in every human relation we see fighting successfully against feelings of fellowship and overpowering the commandment that all men should love one another.“(p.199)   Later (1921), he noted that, "almost every intimate emotional relation between two people which lasts for some time—marriage, friendship, the relations between parents and children—contains a sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility, which only escapes perception as a result of repression" (p. 101).  Extending this theme to groups he states, “In the undisguised antipathies and aversions which people feel towards strangers …. we may recognise the expression of self-love—of narcissism.   … We do not know why such sensitiveness should have been directed to just these details of differentiation; but it is unmistakable that in this whole connection men give evidence of a readiness for hatred, an aggressiveness, the source of which is unknown, and to which one is tempted to ascribe an elementary character (p. 102).

In his only other reference to the narcissism of minor differences Freud (1930) wrote, “It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness…  I gave this phenomenon the name of 'the narcissism of minor differences', a name which does not do much to explain it.  We can now see that it is a convenient and relatively harmless satisfaction of the inclination to aggression, by means of which cohesion between the members of the community is made easier.” (p. 114).

Gabbard (1993), one of the few analysts who has seen the importance of the narcissism of minor differences, rightly points out that here, Freud was perhaps naďve in reaching the conclusion that the perception of minor differences is “convenient and relatively harmless”.  “Only a decade later”, he writes, “ the Holocaust would persuasively demonstrate that the awareness of minor differences between peoples can lead to the most egregious and ghastly manifestations of hatred and contempt”. (Gabbard 1993, p.234).   Gabbard  summarises the essence of Freud’s observations in two related themes:  (1) there is a narcissistic injury inherent in the perception of even small differences between ourselves and others, and (2) there is a fundamental need to maintain cohesion within a community or a group by displacing aggression and contempt onto other groups who possess essentially minor differences.

But why should the perception of minor differences lead to such narcissistic injury?  And why can such violence be released against a group which may be characterised by nothing more than a minor difference?   There is much which remains to be understood in this area but we have learned a good deal about the operation of primitive mental mechanisms which are likely to have a bearing on these questions.   The literature in many of these areas is well know and I will, to begin with, simply itemise what I think are important topics.  I will then discuss some clinical material and argue that humiliation, shame and embarrassment are experiences which demand urgent relief and are usually dealt with by the deployment of narcissistic organisations.  If these defences fail a primitive violence is in danger of being released.  Finally, after mentioning the importance of differentiating between inner psychic reality and external shared reality I will suggest that this distinction requires a judgement to be made which may be difficult for both patient and analyst to arrive at.

It seems to me logical to start with the identification of inner sources of destructiveness, including a consideration of what some analysts cover under the heading of death instinct, and its expression in various forms of which envy has been recognised as most important.   The idea of a death instinct threatening to destroy the individual from within which has to be projected outwards into objects, seems to many to be too fanciful, but it gives rise to a view of man which corresponds more closely to the images created daily on our TV screens. A kind of big bang model in which pent-up destructiveness leads to an explosive fragmentation of the personality seems increasingly appropriate.  This leads to a consideration of the role of the object in dealing with destructiveness which is the area considered in the work of Bion on pathological splitting and on containment.

The containing functions of objects leads to a consideration of narcissism and of narcissistic object relations in which violence and destructiveness are bound in a Pathological Organisation of the personality.  Such organisations operate as a defence against fragmentation but also defend against the experience of separateness.   They are required because separateness makes the individual aware of difference and difference gives rise to both envy and to frustration.   Differences between the sexes and between generations are particularly difficult to bear but other major differences such as those between rich and poor, between married and single, between productive and sterile, or between educated and illiterate are also important in provoking envy and grievance. Minor differences such as colour of skin or facial features, minor differences in religious dogma, differences in clothing or social class, of no significance in themselves, become enormously important as a defence against the major differences.  If the narcissistic organisation is doing its job a kind of mental ethnic cleansing takes place in which envy is obviated by the acquisition of desirable properties belonging to the object and at the same time undesirable elements are projected outwards into a minority group.  It is the existence within the host of this group, characterised by only a minor difference, which is unacceptable and which threatens the whole defensive organisation. The result is a kind of insult which is reacted to with a narcissistic rage.

Humiliation and Embarrassment

Psychoanalysts have also learned a good deal about the behaviour of groups both through the analysis of internal object relations and through the direct study of groups, where for example, “basic assumption” ways of operating have been described.   In these groups a climate develops where primitive mechanisms dominate and powerful pressures ensure that the individual members conform to the group view.   One such pressure to conform arises from the capacity of the group to inflict humiliation, shame and embarrassment on any member who steps out of line. The role played by these distressing emotional states has not always been recognised and because of this I am going to explore them in slightly greater detail by discussing  some clinical material.

Comments on some sessions with a patient in analysis were discussed to try to examine the themes outlined above.

Judgement and Reality

Michael Ignatieff  is a political historian who has made use of Freud’s notion of the narcissism of minor differences in his book entitled Warrior’s  Honour (1998)  which describes some of the outbreaks of violence between near neighbours in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan.   In this book, and particularly in his Guardian article in response to the shock of September 11th.,  he puts forward the view that while understanding of ourselves and of others is vital, understanding alone is not sufficient if we want to protect what is human.   He seems to me to be suggesting that it is judgement, and in particular the judgement of reality which also has to be applied. In psychoanalysis such judgements are often vital and yet difficult for us to make.  When is a patient who brings a suicidal or murderous phantasy in danger of enacting that phantasy in reality?  When are we dealing with a patient capable of understanding and when interpretation futile? 

Ignatieff asks if it is  reasonable to argue that terrorism must be understood, like war, as the rational pursuit of political objectives by other means?  If so, “All the decent-minded proposals of recent days - that America must repent of its imperial hubris, rethink its support of the corrupt Saudis, re-evaluate its policy towards Israel, do public penance for the injustice of a global economy and rain money and food on the poor and starving peoples of the globe,” would be appropriate.  But he  argues that this would be a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the terrorist and what motivates him. “What we are up against”, he writes, “ is apocalyptic nihilism. The nihilism of their means - the indifference to human costs - takes their actions not only out of the realm of politics, but even out of the realm of war itself. ….  Those honest souls who believe the terrorists' hatreds must be understood, and that what they hate must be changed so that they will hate no more, do not understand terrorists. For to them, what is evil cannot change: it can only be extirpated. They know this clearly enough. It is we who do not seem to understand it”.   Ignatieff goes on to remind us that, “Islam is not the only religion of peace to have been hijacked by monstrous impersonators pretending that their rage and their nihilism find warrant in holy books.”

He is clearly outraged by the attack on human values which terrorism represents, and his own judgement and humanity, like ours, is severely tested. He is making a diagnostic judgement about a primitive level of thinking which the terrorists represent and it is one which we are confronted with in our analytic practice and which we normally approach through understanding.  However because it is possible for us to understand some of the factors involved in such situations of hatred this does not mean that the hatred is modifiable through understanding.  In this direction too much weight given to understanding creates a post-modernist stance in which judgement is suspended.

Such reasoning leads to the conclusion that understanding and tolerance is worthless when terrorism like mental opacity cannot be reasoned with.  Is there any role then for attitudes such as those put forward by Isaiah Berlin in these extreme situations?  Ignatieff suggests that tolerance and humanity remain important but not because they will alter the thinking of the terrorist.  They remain important for ourselves and we have to attempt to understand the pull which apocalyptic nihilism has on our own reactions, in order to avoid being drawn into the very same fundamentalist positions which we are trying to oppose.

In my view, we each have to form a judgement of what is right for ourselves, and for my part , the decent proposals put forward by Ignatieff need to be supported in their own right, even though they will do little to prevent terrorism.  They enable us to retain a humanity which can take account of our own prejudices and recognise our own narcissism.   For psychoanalysts the encouragement  to further knowledge put forward by Isaiah Berlin can also counteract a nihilism and support us to increase our understanding of mental processes.  I suspect that narcissism, and the role played by humiliation in its development, are critical areas for further study. We may one day be able to understand why the toxic mixture of prejudice, omnipotence, and fundamentalist religious and political doctrine has such incendiary consequences.   Nevertheless, I doubt if further advances will make all patients treatable nor enable terrorists to have a change of heart.  They may however help us make judgements of what can be achieved and what cannot, and thus protect us from an omnipotent zeal.

References

Copyright © 2002 The Melanie Klein Trust, London.
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